

Water Pricing in Italy Beyond Full-Cost Recovery

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
Water Pricing for a Dry Future

University of California Riverside

Sacramento, February 2-3, 2016

BACKGROUND

Regions and River basins in Italy




The Water Districts (Dlgs 152/2006)



RBD aimed at achieving a more coherent and consistent governance
Legacy however is dominated by fragmentation and piecemeal policy system

Water planning hierarchy



Water rights system


- All waters belong to the public domain
 - Surface waters since 1933
 - Groundwater since 1994
 - Right to discharge since 1976
- Water use requires a license
 - Licenses are released for a limited period (70 yrs)
 - An abstraction fee is levied on licenced uses
 - License implies right to use, but not to trade
 - Are subject to regulations and prescriptions of required behavior
 - May be withdrawn (compensation required in some cases) or made subject to restrictions (e.g. minimum flow requirements) in order to achieve river quality targets
 - In case natural resource does not suffice, emergency plans are issued on an authoritative basis

WATER MANAGEMENT


Some key facts

- Water-rich on average
 - Mountaineous country
 - Alpine chain delivers regular summer flows compensating mediterranean climate
 - Yearly variability very high ($\pm 40\%$) \Leftrightarrow «the rich cry too»
- Very intensive use, especially in the North
 - Encouraged by favourable natural conditions
 - Irrigation is the dominant use (around 50%), established since the Middle Age
 - Management system relatively simple and local; low-tech, low-cost, low productivity \Leftrightarrow extensive patterns of use


Water abstractions in Italy




North




Center



South



Islands



■ PWS

■ Irrigation

■ Industry

■ Hydropower


Water management systems at a glance

| | Bulk systems Resources management | Collective systems | Self supply |
|------------------------------|---|---|---|
| Public water supply | Entities managing multi-purpose reservoirs and bulk supply schemes Entities managing wholesale aqueducts | Integrated water service operator | Residual in scattered settlements |
| Wastewater collection | | Integrated water service operator | Residual in scattered settlements and rural areas |
| Wastewater treatment | | Integrated water service operator | Residual in scattered settlements and rural areas |
| Irrigation | Entities managing multi-purpose reservoirs and bulk supply schemes | Collective landowners' associations | Private wells Small rainwater harvesting |
| Drainage of private property | Collective landowners' associations | Collective landowners' associations | |
| Drainage of public land | | Integrated water service operator | |
| | | Integrated water service operator | |
| Industrial water supply | Entities managing multi-purpose reservoirs and bulk supply schemes | Integrated water service operator Industry-dedicated systems | Private wells |
| Industrial sanitation | Collective landowners' associations | Integrated water service operator Industry-dedicated systems | Individual treatment at industrial premises |

Water management systems at a glance

| | Collective | Self-supply |
|------------|---|---|
| PWS&S | <p>115 undertakings serving 70% of resident population</p> <p>Further 1.500-2.000 small undertakings</p> <p>Trend: further concentration (70 undertakings for 100% of population)</p> | <p>Residual (rural-dispersed population)</p> |
| Irrigation | <p>136 consortia service > 90% of irrigated land and supply approx. 70-80% of total water (depending on years)</p> | <p>Complementary (areas served by collective systems)</p> <p>Dominant where no collective systems are in place</p> |
| Industry | <p>Connected to PWS for sanitary and process uses (when not water-intensive)</p> <p>Some cases of industrial aqueducts in industrial districts; more frequent for wastewater</p> | <p>Dominant for large water-intensive industries (e.g. food, paper)</p> <p>Dominant for cooling (mostly seawater)</p> |
| HP | | <p>Private/Privatized 100%</p> |

Financial flows



Abstraction charges

| | HP | PWS | Hygienic | Fish farming | Industrial | Irrigation | | |
|---------|------|-------|----------|--------------|------------|----------------|------------------|-----------|
| | | | | | | No restitution | With restitution | Unmetered |
| | €/kW | €/mod | €/mod | €/mod | €/mod | €/mod | €/mod | €/ha |
| average | 13.4 | 1,664 | 2,824 | 264.2 | 9,646 | 35 | 8 | 0.33 |
| median | 14.5 | 2,110 | 603 | | 13,474 | 46 | - | 0.40 |
| max | 35.1 | 4,008 | 98,816 | | 41,361 | 190 | 50 | 2.64 |

Module = 100 l/sec

Means less than 1 €c per m3

Abstraction charges

- A missed opportunity so far
 - Long neglected; now again discovered but in a piecemeal and non coordinated way
 - Negligible magnitude (exception for HP and industrial uses); aimed at scarcity rent sharing
 - An order of magnitude lower than public spending in the water sector (some hundred million €/yr)
- Options
 - Significantly increase in order to incorporate ERC
 - Modulate in order to include incentive design
 - Earmark to water policy budget

Water pricing in the past

- Legacy from the past
 - Hardly opex recovered
 - Investments funded by taxpayers
- Drivers of change
 - Fiscal crisis and distress of public finance
 - Prolonged underinvestment
 - Need to start new investment cycle
 - UPP/PPP provides legitimacy, but is not the prime motivation

Water pricing reform in PWS&S

- Aims
 - Achieve financial self-sufficiency
 - Territorial solidarity
 - Industrial operation
 - Efficiency improvement
- Means
 - Full-cost recovery + some residual gvmt subsidies
 - Centralized regulation
 - Cost-based + benchmarking for opex
 - Regulation primarily concerned with total revenue and not on individual rates
 - Two subsequent regulatory approaches (MTN 1996-2011; MTI 2012-present)

Water pricing today

| | Tariff structure | Incentive | Recovery of OPEX | Recovery of CAPEX |
|-----------------------------|--|-----------|------------------|---------------------------------|
| PWS & Sanitation | IBT | *** | Full | New: 84% Total asset: 30-50% |
| Irrigation | Flat (ev. Differentiated acc. to crop, service level) | * | Full | 0-5% |
| | Volumetric (minority of cases) | ** | | |
| Industrial | Volumetric | ** | Full | New: high Total asset: low |


| | Normalized tariff method (MTN) | Transitional tariff method (MTT) | Definitive regulation (MTI) |
|---------------------------------|--|--|---|
| Period | 1996 - 2011 | 2012-2013 | > 2014 |
| Operational costs (Opex) | Estimated through a desktop study Revision admitted but not regulated in detail | Based on 2011 accounts and Opex admitted by previous regulation Opex converge to 2011 accounts or Opex admitted by previous regulation depending on specific circumstances | Opex = average between 2011 accounts and Opex admitted by previous regulation Possibility to define a new OP in case of structural change in service |
| Efficiency gains | Price-cap based on benchmarking formula | No incentives in the transition period Announced for the future | No incentives in the I period Announced for II period |
| Pass-through costs | Electricity, Bulk water, local charges and taxes | As for MTN | As for MTN Electricity cost is passed through, within the limit of average market price * actual consumption |
| Asset base | Assets already owned by operators at book value New investment made by operator at historical cost, anticipated according to the contract (compensation ex post on a triennial basis) | Assets already owned at reconstruction cost New investment at reconstruction cost (only actually realized investments after a time lag of 2 years) Assets owned by municipalities at reconstruction cost (cash flow set aside to the FoNI) | As for MTT Additional provision (anticipation for new investments) foreseen in case RAB < than a certain fraction of investment needs |
| Grants received | Not included | Included (depreciation only). Set aside to the FoNI | As for MTT |
| Depreciation | Any schedule admitted by tax legislation | True economic life | As for MTT |
| Financial amortization | Allowed | Not allowed | Allowed in case the RAB < 50% of investment needs |
| Rate of return | Lump-sum rate (7%) on all investments sourced by the operator (on historical cost basis) | Market-based rate on all investments sourced by the operator (on revalued historical cost) Same rate applied to assets owned by municipalities (revenues set aside to the FoNI) Further lump-sum (1%) for new investments to compensate the time lag | As for MTT |

The devil hides in the details!


- Different ways to intend FCR ...
 - Accounting systems matter (especially for capex)
 - Benchmarking / standard cost vs. actual cost
 - Perimeter of eligible costs matters (e.g. provisions)
- Lead to dramatically different outcomes
 - Tariff dynamics: even 2 times higher!
 - financial sustainability profiles: indicators vary significantly

Two case studies

Case study 1



Case study 2



Typical IBT structures

- Typical features
 - Includes a fixed charge, a subsidized block (for residents only), a baseline block and 3 superior blocks
 - Differentiated schedules according to use (domestic, second houses, commercial, industrial, agricultural etc)
- Controversial effects of IBT on water demand
 - Very little or not effective at all until tariffs were very low
 - Evidence of reduced consumption in the last decade (might be related to tariff increase, although not necessarily and solely to that; further investigation is needed)
 - Low elasticity at the margin; possibly higher one-shot effect due to dramatic price increase occurred

Tariff dynamics

- Impressive dynamics
 - More than doubled in 15 years in real term
 - Further 50-100% increase expected
- However:
 - Starting level very low (one of the lowest in OECD)
 - Still remains low compared to other EU countries
 - Quantity matters! Higher per- capita consumption
↔ lower rates per m³


Average family expenditure

| | % residential | Per-capita consumption | | Annual expenditure | | Average expenditure | |
|------------|---------------|------------------------|-------|--------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------|
| | | m ³ /yr | l/day | € /yr | | €/m ³ | |
| | | | | 60 m ³ | 150 m ³ | 60 m ³ | 150 m ³ |
| North West | 72 | 75 | 205 | 85 | 208 | 1.41 | 1.39 |
| North East | 69 | 59 | 162 | 101 | 256 | 1.68 | 1.71 |
| Center | 71 | 57 | 156 | 111 | 262 | 1.84 | 1.75 |
| South | 79 | 49 | 134 | 103 | 247 | 1.71 | 1.65 |
| Islands | 77 | 52 | 142 | 103 | 253 | 1,72 | 1.68 |
| | | | | | | | |
| Italy | 74 | 60 | 164 | 99 | 242 | 1.65 | 1.61 |

Average tariff structure - 2013

| | Fixed | Subsidized | | Base | | I block | | II block | | III block | Sewage collection | Sewage treatment |
|----------|-------|------------|------------|------|------------|---------|------------|----------|------------|-----------|-------------------|------------------|
| | € | €/m3 | Up to (m3) | €/m3 | Up to (m3) | €/m3 | Up to (m3) | €/m3 | Up to (m3) | €/m3 | | |
| Average | 22 | 0,44 | 88 | 0,81 | 166 | 1,33 | 233 | 2,00 | 339 | 2,81 | 0,21 | 0,48 |
| Max | 31 | 1,12 | 131 | 1,49 | 274 | 2,89 | 390 | 4,08 | 520 | 5,15 | 0,66 | 0,70 |
| Min | 15 | - | 20 | 0,24 | 48 | 0,41 | 96 | 0,84 | 144 | 1,14 | 0,09 | 0,13 |
| n. ATO | | 41 | | 40 | | 40 | | 33 | | 15,00 | 39,00 | 39,00 |
| Pop (ml) | | 28 | | 28 | | 28 | | 24 | | 15,60 | 26,90 | 26,90 |

The average tariff structure (€/year)



■ Fixed charge ■ Variable charge ■ Sewage collection ■ Sewage Treatment

Affordability issues

| | % of IWS on average annual expenditure on total consumption | Incidence of IWS expenditure on the average income poverty line (%) |
|--------|---|---|
| | | |
| 60 m3 | 0.47 | 1.39 |
| 150 m3 | 0.72 | 1.53 |

Affordability still not an issue, but may become so in the future ⇔ future tariff increase expected in the reach of 100-200% depending on local circumstances

Some inter-regional equalization needed ? (under consideration)

Recent literature suggests that utility subsidies are a very inefficient way to protect the poor; Targeted subsidies to be preferred


Irrigation pricing at a glance

| | North-West | North-East | Center | South | Islands | Italy |
|--------------------------------------|------------|------------|--------|-------|---------|-------|
| Irrigation technology | | | | | | |
| Submersion | 80% | 40% | 17% | 14% | 12% | 48% |
| Sprinklers | 19% | 49% | 71% | 42% | 64% | 38% |
| Drip | 1% | 12% | 12% | 44% | 23% | 14% |
| Water distribution technology | | | | | | |
| Gravity | 91% | 64% | 60% | 63% | 45% | 76% |
| Pumped | 9% | 36% | 40% | 37% | 55% | 24% |
| Availability | | | | | | |
| on demand | 26% | 65% | 96% | 48% | 60% | 51% |
| by turns | 74% | 35% | 4% | 52% | 40% | 49% |
| Charging method | | | | | | |
| Surface | 39% | 49% | 37% | 50% | 41% | 45% |
| Volumetric (binomial) | 39% | 49% | 37% | 50% | 41% | 45% |
| Mixed | 21% | 3% | 27% | 0% | 19% | 10% |
| Charges per ha (surface only) | | | | | | |
| average | 123 | 78 | 140 | 169 | 220 | 127 |
| min | 35 | 17 | 55 | 45 | 170 | 17 |
| max | 304 | 220 | 400 | 500 | 270 | 500 |
| Charges per m3 (binomial) | | | | | | |
| Average Fixed charge per ha | 82 | 67 | 36 | 44 | 178 | 68 |
| Average charge per m3 | 0,12 | 0,24 | 0,14 | 0,20 | 1,57 | 0,31 |
| Min charge per m3 | 0,00 | 0,02 | 0,01 | 0,01 | 1,56 | 0,00 |
| Max charge per m3 | 0,24 | 0,86 | 0,22 | 0,40 | 1,57 | 1,57 |

To sum up

- Italian water pricing dominated by financial (rather than micro-economic) considerations
- Incentive design in the PWS&S, but not explicitly targeted at water conservation
- Incorporation of ERC in water tariffs adopted formally, but not effectively
- Policy priority to achieve financial equilibrium and cost recovery \Leftrightarrow Provide signals to OPERATORS vs. FINAL USERS
- Water scarcity more a concern for irrigation and HP w/ possible conflicts vs ENV; not too much for PWS

Withdrawals, delivery and losses: 2005-2012



Water demand declines, but water abstractions increase ⇔ leakage!!
Leakage rate is highest in the areas that are facing higher resource constraint!

A case study about 2003 drought

- Damage observed
 - Very high (1,4 billion€)
 - Adaptation measures helped a lot (could have been 2 times higher)
 - Could have been up to 7 times lower if structural improvements were available (eg reallocation of irrigation water to high value crops)
 - Not worth doing if frequency < 5 yrs
- Distribution matters!
 - Costs shifted on prices, consumers are nets losers
 - Agricultural sector as a whole gained even if some farmers lost

Why such a limited use of pricing signals?

- Policy priorities:
 - Invest in sanitation and rehabilitation of supply networks
 - restore financial sustainability of WSS operation and have access to capital markets
 - Fierce resistance against “commoditisation”
- Transactions costs very high
 - Domestic uses rarely have individual metering
 - in agriculture TC enhanced by structural factors
 - Need to prevent self-supply and encourage connection to collective systems
 - In order to be effective tool of demand mgmt., requires structural transformation (eg pressurized distribution): worth doing?
- Allocation patterns can be improved without too sophisticated practices (priorities very clear)
 - Reliance on administrative decision for macro allocation, possibly improved via participated decision and compensation / PES
 - Other mbi possibly more useful (eg insurance)